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The typical railroad reorganizations before the enactment of Section 77 in I933
did not adversely affect the public interest in transportation service. Receivership
machinery went into motion as soon as earnings and credit had become insuffident
to pay junior fixed charges, but while there was still enough to cover operating ex-
penses, taxes, joint facility rents, senior bond interest and rent for leased roads. By
cutting down those fixed charges junior to all these prior charges the receivership
eased the pressure on the earnings and thus safeguarded the prior charges and the
integrity of operation and service. By deferring or reducing to stock category large
junior principal debts incurred by the road to augment facilities, the typical reor-
ganization enabled railroad users to enjoy those facilities without paying for them.
For these reasons and because reorganization customarily toned up management
and made up for deferred maintenance, receivership usually benefited the public
interest automatically. Hence this interest received no special attention in the re-
ceivership proceedings which were deemed mere debtor-creditor affairs that would
give the public interest due recognition simply by producing a reorganized debt struc-
ture sound enough to enable the road to command new capital requirements cheaply.
Reorganizations are now cutting deeper. Current plans proposed under Section 77
freely upset rights of senior creditors. Foreclosures and collateral sales are prevented,
]eases are rejected, stockholders are obliterated. Sub-section (b) requires new capital
structures to conform more strictly to conservative estimates of future earning power,
regardless of valuations. The new rigor has engendered new pressures to lieep
security holders' sacrifices to minimums by conserving assets and developing
maximum income estimates.
Only two ways exist to increase earnings: by raising revenues and cutting ex-
penses. Depression, industrial relocations, and expanding resort to non-rail transport
have blighted opportunities for increasing traffic and rates, the components of
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The problem of the user interest has been made specific in this article by reference to pending proceed-
ings, including discussion of issues in controversy therein. As to these proceedings the writer is not
disinterested, and his presentation of those issues should be read with that fact in view.
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revenue. Operating expenses arc chicfly for labor and supplies. The mere bankruptcy
of a purchaser does not normally reduce the cost of its supplies. Wage levels, which
average 7!/2 or 80/. above 1929 levels, can be reduced no more easily by a road in
Section 77 than by a solvent road, for subsection (n) forbids judges and trustees from
changing wages or working conditions except as prescribed in the Railway Labor
Act.' Little hope of increasing earnings lies through tax reductions; in fact social
security objectives have imposed-new taxes.
Faced by these barriers, those in charge of reorganizations direct their attention to
those services which every large railroad operates as a public accommodation, and
which alone do not earn their separate costs. The entire passenger service pays on
only a few roads, and on none of these does every passenger train and every stop pay.
Moreover, all railroad systems are consolidations of numerous small roads, and as
systems consolidate they concentrate through traffic onto one line and dry up
duplicate services for system economy. Thus the trend is for fewer segments to
receive the support of through traffic for losing accommodating services. The losing
servkes, passenger and freight, are therefore increasingly- vulnerable to attack under
the new pressure of the severe reorganizations.
II
Yet the- most important interest in railroads, however, is not the interest of the
stockholders, bondholders, labor, or tax-collectors, however public these now may be.
The original and primary interest in. railroads is the public interest in railroad use
and service, which has.always received legal protection under two theories.
x. Through- common law recognition of public dependence on service. The
ancient attitude was classically restated by Chief Justice Waite- in Munn v. llinois:2
Property does become clothed with a public.interest when used in such a manner to
make it of public consequence. and affect the-community at large. When, therefore, one
devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the
public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the com-
mon good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant
by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the
control..
2. Through limitations in franchise grants.' Carriers perform franchise condi-
tions by complying -with the changing concepts of adequate service, reasonable rates,
'See RYOr oF EUnxoaNcr BoAhD Apps'orN Sa-r. 27, s938 INDEx So or KAILwAT Lusox Acr
for history of wage trenrs since x916 and explanation of mechanics of- adjustment. This report found
wage levels generally not too high but containing individual excesses which it implied the roads might
adjust individually rather than via a general horizontal decrease.
'Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 126 (1876).
" Franchises are mandatory or permissive depending on construction. Obligations become attached
to a franchise originally "permissive" when grantee exercises it. and public dependence thereon develops.
Franchises convey only those powers expressly conferred or necessarily implied. Thus the power to
transfer the franchise by lease or otherwise cannot be implied. Courts construe franchises strictly against
the grantee and in light of broad public policy. Legislatures impose new duties by general or special
amendatory statutes in exercise of the state police power, which the legislature cannot abdicate. Commis-
sions enforce franchise duties under statutory rules.
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and absence of discrimination. The statutes and cases have dealt chiefly with the
last two of these, for we have generally had an oversupply of railroad facilities rather
than a lack. Yet to render adequate public service is the foremost obligation; it
persists as long as the carrier elects to enjoy the benefits of its franchises. Public pro-
tection is not limited to constant riders and shippers; it includes the suburban home
owner who without the railroad would pay more for his coal and get less for his
house, the wife of the employee in the local factory which would close if the railroad
stopped, and the butcher, the baker, the candlestick maker who supply commuters
and shippers. Waite spoke of the "community at large," "the common good," of
granting "to the public an interest in the use."
Of course the duty has limits. "Apart from statute or express .contract, people
who have put their money into a railroad are not bound to go on with it at a loss
if there is no reasonable prospect of profitable operation in the future." Such com-
pulsion would be taking private property without compensation in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, even though a specific service fails to cover its
separate costs, it may be properly required when it is necessary, when the carrier's
franchises are generally profitable, and if the weighing of private and public interests
warrants a finding that it is a reasonable burden on the carrier's profitable franchises,5
an indirect income tax or rent reserved to the franchise grantor.
State commissions nowadays measure the franchise duties under broad statutory
powers delegated by the legislatures. Federal regulation is based on Section i (18-20)
of the Interstate Commerce Act, which prevents a road from abandoning a line
without an I. C. C. permissive certificate stating that such abandonment is compatible
with public convenience and necessity as to interstate commerce. The intrastate
service may not be abandoned without a state certificate unless the I. C. C. finds that
continuing the losing intrastate service is an "unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce." 6 The I. C. C., however, exercises no jurisdiction over abandonments of
services when the line is retained for other services.7 Thus a road may cut trains in
interstate or intrastate commerce from ioo per day to i per week without any I. C. C.
certificate. State commissions regulate service as well as line abandonments.
However adequate these state and federal service protection mechanisms may
formerly have Len in a generally expanding economy, they do not today appear to -
secure the public interest against the new pressures of drastic reorganization. These
pressures jeopardize all owned or leased lines and services which can be legally shown
"Holmes, J., in Bullock v. Railroad Commission, 254 U. S. 513 (1921), citing Brooks-Scanlon Co. v.
Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 396 (1920).
s Southern Ry. v. Hatchett, 174 Ky. 463, 192 S. W. 695 (1917), discusses the cases distinguishing
between the right to abandon an entirely insolvent road and the duty to operate losing branches of a
solvent road. See also Brownell v. Old Colony R. R., 164 Mass. 29, 41 N. E. 107 (1895).
' This control is exerted over intrastate commerce only to free interstate commerce from unreasonable
burdens. See Brandeis, J., in Colorado v. U. S., 271 U. S. x53, r63 (1926).
T Public Convenience Appl., Kansas City Southern Ry., 94 1. C. C. 69s (1925); see Proposed Abandon-
ment, Morris & Essex Ry., x75 L C. C. 49 (1931)-
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by a segregation formula or otherwise not to pay their separate costs, despite public
necessity, despite system profit from other services on the same lines and even at
the same stations, and despite system profit from through traffic diverted away from
the particular line in furtherance of consolidated system concentration.8
How the new pressures operate is shown below by a simplified presentation of
the case of the Old Colony lines in the current reorganization of the New York,
New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, a case notable for the magnitude
of the services affected and illustrative of the difficulties in achieving strong, articulate
representation of the user interest. Following this case history, a proposal for imple-
menting user representation will be presented.
'U
Before 1893 the Old Colony Railroad Companyg operated a large integrated
system in southeastern Massachusetts, with three lines to Providence, and rail-water
Long Island Sound lines to New York. It was the only railroad in Fall River, New
Bedford and Brockton, the principal one in Boston, and important in Lowell, Fitch-
burg, and Providence. With one exception its lines embraced the entire present New
Haven system in eastern Massachusetts. Yet it was then in no way dependent upon
the New Haven, for it had excellent through connecting routes west, especially via
the Boston & Albany line, and south via its own Fall River and New Bedford boat
lines, but none via the New Haven.
During i893 the entire Old Colony properties and franchises were transferred to
the New Haven by lease for 99 years, the maximum term permitted by Massachusetts
statutes. The 70 return on Old Colony stock provided in the lease attests the value
of the Old Colony franchises. The Old Colony then went out of the railroad busi-
ness, but its securities improved their seasoned stature in the market, and they stayed
off the New Haven's balance sheet. Yet, as Commissioner Eastman has stated, "a
lease for 99 years is often regarded as the equivalent of ownership in fee, and the Old
Colony was treated by the New Haven as if it were so owned."10
The New Haven acquired full and exclusive use of the properties for a term
longer than any man's lifetime. The asset which provided the going concern value,
the operating organization, was turned over completely and permanently. The New
Haven acquired a majority of Old Colony stock. It transferred the Old Colony's
New York steamboat lines to another New Haven subsidiary. It integrated Old
Colony rail operations with its other lines, merging facilities, scrapping duplications,
and altering traffic channels, all in the interest of system efficiency and in the quest
S While over 35,000 miles of road are leased, this is by no means just a leased line problem. All seg-
ments are vulnerable which can be made subject in reorganization to a segregation of earnings and
expenses which does not show a net income. Current practice divides lines into segments according to
mortgages and leases. The resulting segments, if legally logical, are frequently incapable of separate
operation.
"The name refers to the old Plymouth Colony, now southeastern Massachusetts.
a' Eastman, C., dissenting in New York, N. H. & H. P. R. Reorg., Fin. Doc. 10992 (March 22, 1940)
mimeo. rep. at x78.
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for maximum net income for the New Haven. Several Old Colony routes from Bos-
ton to New York were dried down, with others, to one concentrated route over the
Old Colony's leased Boston & Providence line,"1 which was then promoted as part
of the New Haven's "Shore Line." Traffic was routed away from the historic non-
New Haven Old Colony through routes. The Old Colony Company disappeared
from public concern, and on its former lines the engines, cars, signs, tickets, bills of
lading, time tables, route guides, conductors, and paychecks all bore, and still bear,
only the proprietary label of the New Haven.
The user interest in the Old Colony area obtained the protection of the entire
New Haven system earnings by franchise transfers under the 1893 lease, to which
Massachusetts gave the necessary consent. The New Haven quietly performed the
service for over 45 years, while the area grew industrially and resortwise, and became
inseparably grafted by the railroad into the metropolitan scheme of Greater Boston.
Far more passengers still ride into Boston over the former Old Colony lines to
America's heaviest-volume steam station than ride over the New Haven's fine into
New York. On those Old Colony lines are the chief system freight terminal area,
the largest system shipper, numerous famous industrial plants, a great world port-
and incidentally the system's only steam locomotive repair shops. The New Haven
cannot be operated without parts of those lines.
Such a service might seem invulnerable, but there follows a chronological enu-
meration of the steps by which reorganization has placed it in jeopardy.
I. On October 23, 1935 the New Haven petitioned the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut for reorganization under Section 77. The court
appointed trustees for its properties, who tentatively continued paying Old Colony
rentals. The general public was justifiably not alarmed. It seemed that the splendid
property would be relieved at last from extravagant debt burdens created in the early
twentieth century. Old Colony stock climbed back from its 1935 low of 39 to 7o by
March 30, 1936; its bonds rose to 90.
2. On June x, 1936, the trustees, on the basis of earning power studies prepared
for them, rejected the lease as unprofitable, thus putting on Old Colony the primary
duty of entering and operating its railroads. Service would have stopped had the
lease rejection entailed cessation of operation by the New Haven, for, although
deferentially termed 4 "carrier" in subsequent proceedings, the Old Colony was still
just a bookkeeping device. It had neither funds, organization, nor equipment to
operate its railroads, and the latter had become unworkable apart from the system.
Accordingly, on June 3, 1936 the court ordered the New Haven trustees to continue
operating the lines entirely as before, but, retroactively since October 23, 1935, for the
account of the Old Colony, as authorized by subsection (c) (6) . 2
2' The line of the Boston & Providence -. &., which was leased to the Old Colony in 1888 for 99 years,
was part of the Old Colony system turned over to the New Haven in 1893.SThis paragraph puts the duty to operate upon lease rejection in the lessor "unless the judge, upon
the petition of the lessor, shall decree after hearing that it would be impracticable and contrary to the
public interest for the lessor to operate the said line, in which event it shall be the duty of the lessee to
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3- Simultaneously the court approved the Old Colony's petition for reorganiza-
tion in the same proceedings as a stock subsidiary of the New Haven. On June 18,
1936 the three New Haven trustees were appointed trustees of the Old Colony."
4. On June i, 1937 the New Haven proposed a plan of reorganization providing
for acquisition of all of Old Colony's properties on terms which included the ex-
change of two new New Haven shares for each outstanding Old Colony share.
Old Colony- interests demanded more, and 1. C. C. plan hearings went into the con-
troversial measures of Old Colony's severance or strategic value, the contribution of
its traffic to system earnings, value of particular facilities, potential economies, etc.
5. The trustees needed a basis for charging the Old Colony for operating its
roads. Their studies were reduced to a segregation formula, a device for cutting the
patient in two and allocating to the part called Old Colony separate revenues and
expenses and a share of the joint items. "No adequate formula can be devised for
such a purpose,"14 and this one created controversy. The I. C. C. on reference found
that, while the formula failed to recognize severance and contributory value and the
value of particular facilities, those items were properly left for consideration in the
plan hearings." The I. C. C. found the formula "as fair and equitable as circum-
stances will permit,"" but it was careful to state also that its recommendations were
"in no wise intended to express any views with respect to the use of the results ob-
tained from the application of the formula or the weight to be given ;uch results."'17
This "approval" was issued April 15, 1938, and confirmed by the district court
May 25. No appeal was taken by the Old Colony.
6. On July i8, 1938 the court approved trustees' accounts charging the Old Colony
with over $ii,oooooo for advances, representing very largely deficits segregated under
the formula. An appeal was then taken, but the Circuit Court of Appeals held that
it was too late for Old Colony to attack the formula.W 8 The operating deficits were
allowed as administrative expenses against the Old Colony estate with priority over
continue operation on or for the account of the lessor until the abandonment of such line is authorized by
the Commission in accordance with the provisions of Section i of the Interstate Commerce Act as
amended."
" The New Haven trustees were -ordered to continue operating the Old Colony in the system, quite
as before, but filing separate accounts. As the Old Colony's trustees they have contested those accounts
and represented its side in the litigations through separate counsel. Appointment of identical men for both
posts has caused avoidable criticism, but its vice lies not in any partialiti but in the fact that their enforced.
impartiality prevents Old Colony from having the partial, aggressive management it deserves if it is to be
separately charged. See note 24, infra. Since the added income which a separate Old Colony could obtain
is a factor in the reorganization plan negotiations, this vice is mitigated as to the security holders but not
as to the public.
The absence of separate trustees renders the case analogous to one where the lines involved are owned
outright, even though mortgaged, for no separate operating trustees would there be appointed. Nor would
there always be special security holders' counsel to argue on behalf of the lines.
" Eastman, C., dissenting, in New York, N. H. & H. R. It Reorg., Fin. Doc. 10992 (March a2, x940)
mimeo. rep. at x8o.
Ir New York, N. H. & H. R. I,. Rcorg., 224 . C. C. 723. 729 (1938).
11d. at 732. " Id. at 725.
:' Palmer v. Palmer, 104 F. (2d) 16r (C. C. A. 2d, x939).
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the Old Colony mortgage. Deficits have continued annually. Old Colony stock
has fallen below 50 cents a share.
7. After the June 1937 plan hearings, the I. C. C. examiner found that no reor-
ganization plan could be accomplished because of the drastic mid-i 93 7 recession.
8. Meanwhile the trustees turned to economy. Several minor abandonments were
consummated with I. C. C. approval; other discontinuances and curtailments were
made without the necessity of such approval. In some cases highway transport was
substituted. The former Old Colony steamboat lines to New York were abolished
(although competing non-New Haven lines are able to continue). This system econ-
omy deprived Old Colony lines of considerable through "overhead" traffic, as did
further route concentrations which were effected.
9. On December 28, 1937, the trustees applied to the Massachusetts Department
of Public Utilities for authority to stop passenger service to 88 stations, without
stopping freight service. The D. P. U. commenced lengthy hearings.
io. On June 2o, 1938, the savings bank bondholders' committee and the trustees
both prayed the district court for authority to close the station service regardless of
the D. P. U. The court notified the state, which appeared-in the hearing (the first
appearance in this chain of court and I. C. C. proceedings by a public agency) against
the petition but did not produce witnesses, cross-examine, or argue against the court's
jurisdiction. The order was issued,"9 the station service stopped, and the state ap-
pealed. An unpaid legislative commission was appointed to investigate.
ii. On July i9, 1938, the New Haven trustees with court approval performed one
of their two main functions as Old Colony trustees by rejecting the Boston &
Providence lease of I88, since that line had operating deficits under the formula.
m. On January 16, i939, the Circuit Court of Appeals held the 88 stations order
invalid as beyond the court's jurisdiction.2 0 The trustees appealed, and the stations
remained dosed.
13. On May 31, 1939, the Old Colony filed an amended plan of reorganization
providing for abandonment of the main owned lines of the Old Colony, the so-called
"Boston Group," including the heaviest-traveled railroad into Boston, which after
the curtailments still had 121 passenger trains and large industries including one
plant now employing i7,ooo men: The New Haven in its simultaneous amended
plan announced that it was npw."unwilling" to acquire the Old Colony unless the
passenger service on the'Boston Group ceased, but it proposed to acquire the Boston
& Providence directly (short-circuiting the Old Colony) for a high consideration,
including waiver of the segregation deficits.
" New York R. H. & H. R7 R. Reorg. Order No. z89, July 7, 1938 (D. Conn.). The order had
precedents: New York, S. & NV. R. R. Reorg., Orders Nos. 29, 32, Nov. 1937 (N. D. N. J.); Fonda, J. &
G. R. R. Reorg., Order, March 19, 1938 (N. D. N. Y.), discussing authorities. The theory of the order was
(s) exclusive bankruptcy jurisdiction to effect reorganization; (2) prevention of reorganization by segre-
gation formula deficits; (3) reduction of those deficits by the discontinuances. The order applied also to
stations on owned lines, subject to divisional mortgage segregation. See Transcript of Hearings on Petition
for Order No. 289.
oConverse v. Massachusetts, sos F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 2d, x939).
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14. On June 14, the trustees summarily posted notices of complete passenger dis-
continuances on the Boston Group in September, acting under general court authority
to take steps toward economy but without any special authority.
15. These notices threw the area and the Boston State House into an uproar of
confusion, resentment, and panic. The legislative commission reported hopelessness
and expired. The attorney-general threatened to have New Haven franchises re-
voked. A special committee recommended a new unpaid legislative commission to
the governor, who pleaded with the trustees to await the new commission's report.
The trustees petitioned the court for instructions; the latter persuaded the trustees
and the legislative commission (not the D. P. U.) to agree on negotiations for com-
promise, the discontinuance to be postponed until January, x94o and the trustees free
to bring abandonment proceedings.
x6. At the new plan hearings in June, 1939 the presiding commissioner declined
to consider the abandonment provision without the formalities of an I. C. C. aban-
.donment proceeding.
.. 17. November 6, 1939 the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court of Appeals
in the 88 stations case, holding that the bankruptcy did not give the judge power
to supervene the state's normal regulatory power, except in a plan of reorganization. 1
The D. P. U. then postponed an order to reopen the 88 stations until the trustees
could present proper evidence.
18. The trustees continued private conferences with the new legislative commis-
sion concerning a reduced "interim schedule" for the Boston Group, but during
the conferences they started an I. C. C. abandonment petition under Section 1(x8).
19. On November 3o, the Old Colony filed a second amended plan containing
provision for amending the charters of the Old Colony and the New Haven so that
neither would be bound to operate passenger service anywhere on the Old Colony.
2o. In February, ix4o the D. P. U. ordered 32 stations out of 88 finally reopened,
and in March approved a reduced service of 72 trains instead of 1x, estimated to
save S-ooooo per year.
21. March 16, x94o, the I. C. C. opened abandonment hearings. The trustees
presented a case on behalf of Old Colony security holders on the theory that they
were saddled with the trustees' segregated deficits as the sole measure of operating
cost which would devour their estate unless abandonment were granted.
25. As of March 22, i94o, the I. C. C. approved a plan of reorganization for the
New Haven recommending inclusion of the Boston & Providence but not of the Old
Colony proper as to the status of which decision was deferred.2 2 Commissioner East-
man wrote a vigorous dissent, castigating the segregation formula as a measure of
value. Petitions for reopening were filed in May and argument thereon was heard
June 27, i94o, when the Old Colony again urged its plan to merge the roads with
the antipassenger charter amendments. The petitions to reopen, together with the
abandonment case, are pending.
'x Palme v. Ma2SchusctMS, 308 U. S. 79 (1939).
' New York, N. H. & H. R. P_ Reorg. supra notr zo.
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IV
This chronology shows how the reorganization maneuvers have established a
situation where, as things stand now, the Old Colony service has been cut off from
the support both of the New Haven, despite the consolidation of 1893, and of the
Boston and Providence, despite the consolidation of 1888. This service is even
deprived of the strength of an independent Old Colony, for the sole measure of its
right to support used thus far in both the 88 stations order and the abandonment
proceedings is the segregated Old Colony deficits. In the abandonment case the Old
Colony interests, while regretting that they were unable to prevent these deficits
from being charged as prior liens or to contest the formula, asserted that, right or
wrong, the deficits were being charged against them and were not open to attack.
Hence, under the most liberal view of due process, any requirement of continued
operation of any losing service at their expense was confiscation.
This attitude may be understandable, but certainly its assumptions are not
axiomatic. If, for purposes of service abandonments, the fiction is to be indulged in
that the Old Colony is a separate carrier, then must its status be determined by a
formula devised for allocations of system revenue and costs? Instead, should it not
be entitled to a formula reflecting advantages which would be sought by a man-
agement primarily interested in the Old Colony's welfare rather than, as now,
in the system welfare? Important among these would be (a) diversions of through
freight back to the old routes whereon the Old Colony, rather than the system, would
get maximum return,2 4 and (b) divisions of through rates with the New Haven under
the principles of Section 15(6) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which permit the
I. C. C. to fix divisions among separate carriers giving due consideration to, among
other things, "the amount of revenue required to pay their respective operating
expenses, taxes, and a fair return on their property ... and the importance to the
public of the transportation services of such carriers ... and any other fact or circum-
stance which would ordinarily, without regard to the mileage haul, entitle one carrier
to a greater or less proportion than another carrier"? This was one of the grounds
on which the Old Colony tried to have the segregated deficits through 1937 set aside
because the formula ignored this principle, but, as noted, this attack was held
procedurally too late.25 Should the public be bound by this limitation?
The same opinion also stated that the question was beside the point, because the
Old Colony did not have the status of a separate carrier necessary to invoke Section
15 (6). 6 If the realities are to be faced and the integral position of the Old Colony
lines in the system frankly recognized, then why should not their service be accorded
the benefit of continuing system support? It is by no means clear that subsection
"Old Colony R. R. Abandonment Hearings, Fin. Doe. 12614, Rec., passim, esp. pp. 13, 155-156.
"Railroad agents seek maximum traffic and revenue for their system. The New Haven system receives
greatest revenue and mileage from Old Colony western freight when routed via the New Haven to the
Hudson. The Old Colony receives much more under the formula via its old non-New Haven routes
west. Since these give the New Haven system much less, agents on the Old Colony do not prefer them.
" Palmer v. Palmer, supra note r8. toId. at 165.
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(c) (6) permits the New Haven to abandon the lines without an I. C. C. adjudication
that the New Haven is not able to support them as part of its system.2 7 Should not
the lines at least get the support of the concededly heavy system earnings contributed
by Old Colony's traffic on the rest of the system lines? Or certainly that portion
which the system would lose if the Old Colony were really severed? Should the users
be denied any system status accorded Old Colony security holders.F9
The merits of these contentions await determination; it is enough here to show
that there are grave and subtle controversies, too many of which were resolved against
the user interest before that interest attained recognition. True, the attorney-general
obtained the overthrow of the 88 stations court order. But no public advocate has
appeared in any segregation formula proceeding, and the 88 stations case left open
the device of abandonments via a plan of reorganization. Nor has any of the dc-
cisions placed limits on the use of the formula in the I. C. C. abandonment case.
Public officials in Massachusetts have been confused. They properly were not
elected for knowledge of the esoteric concepts and techniques of railroad reorganiza-
tion, and for four years they had no firm standing in the chain of proceedings. Their
freedom of practical action has been hampered by statutory limits on their powers
and also by business and political requirements of their offices. They are all busy
men. They cannot wade into this railroad snarl and urge tax reductions, labor cuts,
rate increases, or service reductions without danger of political embarrassment. The
public interest is manifold, and its branches conflict.
V
In late 1939 a small group of people who themselves actually needed the railroad,
formed an organization for the sole purpose of representing exclusively the user
branch of the public interest. The Old Colony Commuters & Shippers League 29
follows in the tradition of Brandeis' and Eastman's Public Franchise League of an
earlier day in Boston. 0  The League now has over xaoo members, including both
individual citizens and business corporations, and has brought important civic groups
into active alliance.
The League had no panacea but was determined to secure adequate and stable
service and had faith that by clearly and imaginatively exploring the complex legal
" Cf. Meek, The Problems of the Leased Line, infra p. 512, and, for greater detail, Meck, Railroad
Leases and Reorganization: II (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1401, 1403. See also.Friendly, Amendment of the
Railroad Reorganization Aet (1936) 36 CoL. L REv. 27, 48. Cf. Webster & Atlas Nat, Bank v. Palmer,
I x F. (2d) 215, 218 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
2IlThe segregated deficits are not the basis on which the capital value to be given Old Colony security
holders in New Haven reorganization securities will be determined. Against them will be offset the
severance value to the New Haven, i.e., income concededly now accruing to New Haven from traffic on
its own lines which it would not have if it lost the Old Colony. Also in the measure will be the damages
allowed already to some $5o,ooo,ooo (a sum greater than its entire 1936 capitalization) for leash rejection
and defaults. Thus the rejection was not a true divorce as to the Old Colony security holders but created
for them a substitute position directly in the system. While the priority of the deficits is superficially
alarming, the final plan will include items deemed fair and equitable in light of the history, and the
1. C. C. plan for the Boston & Providence suggests that ultimately the segregated deficits of Old Colony
will likewise be given short shrift.
2 Originally "Old Colony Commuters League." oSee LIFi, BRANDEIS (1936) 66 if., 76 if, 2o.
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relations and economic facts a way would be found to make the railroad work. It
preempted the position of chief speaker for the user interest and its general committee
of leading citizens from all affected towns is able to say what service is really needed
and what is not. Therefore it urged the D. P. U. not to reopen most of the 88 stations
as a fair sacrifice to save the remaining service. As to that, it collaborated with the
railroad in securing the reduction in trains from xr to 72. It has appeared in town
hearings for railroad bus permits and overcome natural prejudice against the peti-
tioners. It has encouraged the reluctant railroad to petition to save $i5oooo by
automatic grade crossing installations. It cooperated in a campaign by the Boston wing
in the railroad organization to increase freight use and has pledged all League mem-
bers to use the railroad whenever possible. It has distributed a series of informative
circulars, zo,ooo at a time.'1
Although it found that Massadiusetts opinion had cast the New Haven and its
trustees as villains in the piece, the League recognized that the Old Colony is geared
only to be part of the New Haven and that therefore the major objective must be
to persuade, or if necessary to force, the New Haven to adopt and merge the Old
Colony lines legally as well as factually. Hence with some trepidation (for none of
its active members had ever been in a railroad reorganization) the- League secured
general intervention in the L C. C. plan proceedings to advocate what it deems to be
"compatible with the public interest."32 This intervention, which unfortunately came
after the record had been dosed,- seems to have set a precedent. The League filed
cxceptions-to the proposed-November plan and, after the I. C. C. March, x9o, plan
was issued, petitioned for a review and reopening for insertion of new matter con-
cerning Old Colony value in the system. In June it argued on that petitionwhich is
pending. The League's biggest efforts have been in the 1. C. C. abandonment case
where it presented the case for local actual necessity and is trying--unsuccessfully. so
far--to disestablish the trustees' theory of the case. This case is likewise pending.
A special contribution-of the League has been to act as a magnet, bringing parties
in from extreme to conciliatory positions. Quietly and continually, but apparently
without antagonizing, it suggests constructive moves for other parties to make. It
seeks to reach beyond the normal ambir of reorganization. Not permitted in the
1. C. C. abandonment hearing to discuss ultra-modern motor-cars with pombly one-
or two-man crews instead-of four- or five-man crews on present minimum steam
trains, the League is promoting their consideration in other ways.P It is encouraging
local property tax reductions by towns and hopes to present a new general reform
" One purpose of these circulars was to combat suspicion that the League by aiding the railroad had
become a railroad stooge. *' iyy(d) ist par.
"The League recently invited local public and-press officials to a demonstration of the new cars on the
N. Y., S. & W. in New Jersey which are expected to be operated for 35 cents per mile, a figure far lower
than any conceded by the New Haven.
Coordination with other carriers by rail (including transit lines) and highway is being considered by
the League, including the utilization by the B. & A. of the Old Colony's Boston coach yard instead of its
own, an economy estimated, in a a935- report by both roads to the Federal Coordinator, to provide
$235,ooo annual savings, plus release of valuable land ripe for civic development.
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railroad tax statute to the next legislature which will aid insolvent roads. Also it
hopes to have the railroad segregate great non-railroad landholdings, perhaps into a
separate subsidiary, to take the burden of Greater Boston's increasing realty taxes out
of the railroad accounts. The League hopes, if heavy steam trains can be removed,
to initiate labor adjustments which will be helpful to all sides, including labor 3 4
VI
The League's aspirations are definitely off the beaten track. But why should not
such things be gone into in a railroad bankruptcy if it will save service? One excuse
is the traditional limits of reorganization scope to debtor-creditor adjustments. The
new deeper reorganizations demand broader techniques. Another is the fact that
outlets for the new reorganization pressures to develop earning power are blocked in
other directions than service abandonments. A third is the domination of reorganiza-
tions by busy lawyers who too often do not really know their properties. Many have
never seen them; most have never really analyzed operations, traffic opportunities,
rate policies, labor agreements, or cooperative economies with other roads. Even
when the lawyers are railroad experts, they wring the statutes and precedents for
brilliant legal devices to prefer their clients above other groups in reorganization-
and that is what they are hired to do. However valid these tactics, they do not solve
the service problem of the railroad.
The lawyers and courts rely on the trustees for smart management. Other .than
the presidents of the roads, these usually come in from such non-railroad work as
* insurance executiveship and must themselves rely heavily on notably conservative
organizations of men largely trained from youth in compartmentalized routines,85
to which the reorganization has added shackles of fear. Partisan groups also engage
the services of economist-advocates, whom they qualify as experts to present data and
analyses in favor of their views.
While the district judges do not pretend to know the minute ramifications of the
sprawling roads in their custody and work under the pressure of a Supreme Court
mandate of speed,"8 "the judicial process in bankruptcy proceedings under Section 77
is, as it were, brigaded with the administrative process of the Commission"37 in many
aspects where the public interest is affected. But the I. C. C. is a tribunal whose
primary function is as arbiter,8 and even in that function is badly overworked. 8'
lThe League is not anti-labor. It agrees with the Coordinator that labor-saving changes with humane
safeguards for men displaced is, considering all factors, in the best interests of railroads and labor. See
FED. COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATIOx, 4TH REPoxr (1936) 73.
'5See FEn. COORDINATOR oF TRA;sPoRTAno., PAssENoER TRAPFIc RPoaT (1935) 51.
'Continental I1l. Nat. Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 648, 685 (t935).
', Frankfurter, J., in Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 87 (1939).
"See Nelson, Representation, of the Consumer Interest in the Federal Government (1939) 6 LAw &
CrNrra. PRO,. x:5, x56. "The Commission [has) increasingly emphasized its judicial function at the
expense of its role as public defender. .. . This tendency appears to have been inevitable. . . . It is
obviously impossible for the same group of officials to act as impartial arbiters and as zealous defenders
of one of the parties involved. . .. As a result, the [consumer interest] has been largely unrepresented at
court and has lacked an effective voice in the Commission's deliberations."
so Dembitz, Progress and Delay in Railroad Reorganizations Since t933, supra, p. 415.
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The New Haven case-there will be many ike it4 - shows that the "consumer"
interest needs a more positive form of representation. However this interest may be
organized, it calls for an able and courageous spokesman, free from financial and
political entanglements, who in advocating its cause against the reorganization
pressures will ensure that squeezing out the users is not taken as the road of least
resistance. In doing this the spokesman must not hesitate to conciliate rigid partisan
insistences or to promote vigorous, even unorthodox, operating improvements, tax
and labor adjustments, coordinations, public aid devices, etc. His legal status in the
proceedings must be unquestioned. His work and that of an adequate staff should
be recognized as valuable to the reorganization and entitled to reasonable support
currently from the railroad estate.
Reliance upon a volunteer group of citizens organized to protect their rail service,
such as the League in the New Haven case, will seldom result in meeting the fore-
going specifications. The League's germination was a happy accident. Spontaneous
generation of such groups will be infrequent. If they arise, time-consuming intricacies
will limit their effectiveness. If the unccngenial task of soliciting private contribu-
tions is to be avoided, the court must be persuaded to permit intervention in the
proceedings on a basis allowing compensation; yet this will present difficulties when
more than one user representative emerges. '
The problem of consumer advocacy has plagued other fields of government
regulation. In the NRA, the AAA, and the Bituminous Coal Commission a perma-
nent consumers' counsel was made part of the regulatory mechanism.42 It would
seem that in railroad reorganizations this device would not -serve best, for the railroad
geography in each area is individual and the problems, of each area are likewise
diverse. The consumers' agency must therefore combine 'capability with knowledge
of local conditions and procedures, and it should bring a fresh approach into each
case. This could scarcely be expected of a section in any department or bureau.
Fortunately a simple solution is at hand, for which no new legislation is needed.
Under the existing statute43 the I. C. C. may adopt the practice of appointing in all
cases where conditions warrant a special users' counsel with a staff. The counsel
should preferably be resident in the general region affected and be advised by com-
mittees representative of the various localities and classes of service involved. The
" As pressures increase, regional consolidations seem inevitable, concentrating through traffic on the
most efficient routes to a degree approximating current concentration of through express and parcel post
traffic. This will produce savings, estimated in the Prince-Barriger Plan of 1933 at $2,000,000 daily. Yet
it will withdraw from more lines the support of through traffic and threaten the integrity of their
remaining service.
" There is the risk of duplication of argument, time, erpense. Towns and civic boards have separate
counsel. Occasionally, too, a member of the lunatic fringe will gather sufficient backing to enable him to
assert representation of a public interest. Sound exercise of judicial discretion is a better protection against
these dangers than formulation of a rule excluding all except state officials. Incidentally, the latter, in
addition to their other difficulties, will be especially handicapped where the particular service affected
involves two or three states.
"'Discussed in Nelson, supra note 38. '4 S77(c)(12).
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I. C. C. is better equipped than courts or state political officers to select men for the
post with the qualifications which have been outlined."
State officialdom should appreciate relief from sole responsibility for advocating
the public interest in these specialized and occasionally embarrassing proceedings.
Those financial interests which seek rehabilitation of the road as a going concern
rather than mere salvage for a class of system investors should find the special
counsel's objectives compatible with their own. Finally, both the court and the Com-
mission itself should welcome the addition of a capable and authentic users' spokes-
man to assist them in their determinations of the public interest.
"1The district coi, xt would, however, have to approve the employment. Section 77(c)(12) provides:
.the judge . . .may make an allowance to be paid out of the debtor's estate for the actual and
reasonable expenses incurred in ornection with the proceedings and plan and reasonable compensation for
services in connection therewith by ... such assistants as the Commission with the approval of the judge
may especially employ."
